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FOUCAULT AND GADAMER: LIKE APPLES AND ORANGES
PASSING IN THE NIGHT
GARY WICKHAM*

INTRODUCTION

In introducing their book, Michel Foucault:Beyond Structuralism
and Hermeneutics, (first published in 1982, one of the earliest
attempts in English at a book-length exposition of the direction and
nuances of Foucault's work-one which has stood the test of time),
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow tell us that philosophical
hermeneutics "gives up the phenomenologists' attempt to understand
man as a meaning-givingsubject, but attempts to preserve meaning by
locating it in the social practices and literary texts which man
produces." 1 They go on to identify two types of hermeneutics which
emerged from Heidegger's Being and Time.
The first involves "the way Dasein interprets itself in this
everyday activity. This 'primordial understanding' in our everyday
practices and discourse, which is overlooked by the practitioners but
which they would recognize if it were pointed out to them, is the
subject of much recent hermeneutic investigation. '2 This school of
Heideggerian hermeneutics 3 "claims to find that the deep truth
hidden by the everyday practices is the unsettling groundlessness of a
way of being which is, so to speak, interpretation all the way down."'
They suggest that this school can be characterized as "the
hermeneutics of suspicion." 5
The second type of hermeneutics is that developed by HansGeorg Gadamer. It "gives deep hermeneutics a more positive
* Senior Lecturer, Sociology Programme, Murdoch University. I thank Alan Hunt and
Jeff Malpas for their helpful comments and suggestions, and I thank Jay Mootz for his
encouragement.
1. HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS, at xv (1982).
2. Id. at xvii.
3. See id. at xvii-xviii. They cite Harold Garfinkel, Charles Taylor, Clifford Geertz, and
Thomas Kuhn as examples.
4. Id. at xviii.
5. Id.
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direction as a method for reappropriating a profound understanding
of Being preserved in traditional linguistic practices."'6 Dreyfus and
Rabinow argue that Foucault does not belong in either of these
groupings of hermeneutists. They express their argument with a great
deal of vigor in regard to the second possibility:
Foucault is not interested in recovering man's unnoticed everyday
Foucault does not believe that a hidden
self-interpretation ....
deep truth is the cause of the misinterpretation embodied in our
everyday self-understanding. He [Foucault] captures all such
positions... [especially] Gadamer's[,] at an appropriate level of
abstraction when he defines what he calls commentary "as the reapprehension through the manifest meaning of discourse of another
meaning at once secondary and primary, that is, more hidden but
also more fundamental" [The Order of Things]. Such an account of
interpretation, he claims, "dooms us to an endless task ... rest[ing]
on the postulate that speech is an act of 'translation' . . . an exegesis,
which listens.., to the Word of God, ever secret, ever beyond
itself" [Birth of the Clinic]. Foucault dismisses this approach with
waited in vain for the decision
the remark, "For centuries we have
7
of the word [Birth of the Clinic]."
Charged, as I am, with exploring the possibility that Gadamerian
philosophical hermeneutics, especially as it has been taken up as a
framework for furthering critical sociolegal investigations, may have
some things in common with some recent developments in
Foucaultian thinking-the "governmentality" approach-which has
also recently started being used to guide some excursions into
sociolegal studies, I would like to say that things have changed since
Dreyfus and Rabinow penned the above sentiments. I would like to,
but I cannot. While certain Gadamerian moves seem at first glance to
speak directly to the Foucaultian "governmentality" way of going
about particular studies, including sociolegal studies, on closer
examination the similarities evaporate. While I do my best to sound a
positive "let's get together again soon" note, I confess at the outset
that most of my argument here suggests that Foucaultian sociolegal
studies and Gadamerian sociolegal studies will remain no more than
nodding acquaintances.
I am not particularly concerned here with promoting the
Foucaultian governmentality approach, or even explicating it, though
I readily acknowledge that I am very much a Foucaultian govern8
mentality thinker in the Gadamerians' den.
6. Id. at xix.
7. Id.
8. "Being a Foucaultian" is, as far as I can tell, my only "area of expertise" (a tragic
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In the first Part of this Article, I provide both a brief summary of
the governmentality approach and a few indications of its
applicability to sociolegal studies, but I do so more by way of allowing
the reader to see the position from which I pose my gloomy
assessment of potential relations between the Gadamerians and
Foucaultian governmentality scholars than by way of serious
explication. In the second Part, I go on with my opening gambitexamining some basic differences between the main direction of
Foucault's work and philosophical hermeneutics. Third, I explore a
small sample of Gadamerian literature to show how the pieces

examined in fact support the proposition that useful links between
Gadamerians and Foucaultians are unlikely. 9 Finally, I discuss just a

few possible exceptions to this trend, taking us more firmly onto the
ground of the sociolegal (a ground which is glimpsed at various points
in the earlier parts).
Please allow me a point of terminology before I proceed.

I

appreciate that the focus of this Symposium is "critical legal studies,"
and I appreciate that this is a very definite movement within North
American sociolegal scholarship as well as a definite way of
approaching such scholarship. I beg the reader's indulgence here: the
term has no such currency in Australia. As such, I prefer, as is
already clear, the Anglo-Australian term "sociolegal studies," and I

use it or some variant of it throughout.
I.

SUMMARIZING THE FOUCAULTIAN GOVERNMENTALITY

APPROACH AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR SOCIOLEGAL SCHOLARS

In a recent, comprehensive book-length survey of the notion of
governmentality, Mitchell Dean acknowledges that the "study of
governmentality is continuous with" some aspects of theories of the
state (particularly in that it too "regards the exercise of power and
confession in itself). I assume I have been invited to participate in this delightful Symposiuman invitation for which I am most grateful-in order provide a view from a Foucaultian
perspective, not in spite of it.
9. I pretend to make no exegesis in this Part. I pointedly use a hybrid Gadamer/
Gadamerian, constructed from parts presented to me by only a few scholarly writings, including
some of a sociolegal nature. Even when the signatures on these resources include that of HansGeorg Gadamer I do not claim to approach any "essence of Gadamer." I make this move not
just out of a commitment to a theoretical stance that denies the possibility of pinning down any
authorial core, but more by way of realistic appraisal of what a short article such as this can
achieve. I cannot offer anything approaching a comprehensive view or review, so I do not try (I
do not insult Gadamerian scholarship by attempting to claim membership without the necessary
qualifications). I can offer an argument, and that I do try; if my argument falls because my tiny
sample of Gadamerian literature turns out to be an unrepresentative sample, then so be it.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:913

authority as anything but self-evident"), notes that it "does, however,
break with many of the characteristic assumptions of theories of the
state," 10 and outlines Foucault's understanding of the basic notion of
government as "the conduct of conduct," especially as it involves
thinking about the very act of governing.1
He moves on to a
definition of the term "governmentality":
It is possible to distinguish two broad meanings of this term in the
literature. The second is a historically specific version of the
first .... In this first sense, the term "governmentality" suggests

what we have just noted. It deals with how we think about
governing, with the different mentalities of government .... The
notions of collective mentalities and the idea of a historians of
mentalities have long been used by sociologists (such as Emile
Durkheim and Marcel Mauss) and by the Annales school of history
in France .... For such thinkers, a mentality is a collective,

relatively bounded unity, and is not readily examined by those who
inhabit it .... The idea of mentalities of government, then,
emphasizes the way in which the thought involved in practices of
government is collective and relatively taken for granted .... [This]
is to say that the way we think about exercising authority draws
upon the theories, ideas, philosophies and forms of knowledge that
are part of our social and cultural products.12
Dean elaborates the second meaning (the one that is "a
historically specific version of the first") as follows:
Here, "governmentality" marks the emergence of a distinctly new
form of thinking about and exercising of power in certain
societies .... This form of power is bound up with the discovery of
a new reality, the economy, and concerned with a new object, the
population.
Governmentality emerges in Western European
societies in the "early modern period" when the art of government
of the state becomes a distinct activity, and when the forms and
knowledge and techniques of the human and social sciences
become integral to it. 3
Such a complex approach obviously could not have come from
just one schematic essay produced by Foucault in the late 1970s-On
Governmentality.14 Rather, this approach is the culmination of a
particular reading of Foucault's oeuvre coupled with a rejection of
standard sociological and political scientific accounts of power. There
have been quite a few attempts by those who have followed Foucault

10. MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNMENTAL1TY 9 (1999).

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 10-16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19.
Michel Foucault, On Governmentality (Rosi Braidotti trans., 1979).

2000]

FOUCA ULTAND GADAMER: LIKE APPLES AND ORANGES

917

to explicate and defend this approach.15 I have already said this is not
my task here, but before I move on to my main tasks, I present a
couple of other introductions to the approach written directly for
sociolegal audiences.
In a recent piece in a North American law journal, the noted
Foucaultian sociolegal scholar Pat O'Malley goes about the task of
introducing governmentality scholarship to an audience he assumes to
be unfamiliar with it:
There is a considerable literature exploring and developing this
approach .... Such work has been influenced strongly by the
thinking of Michel Foucault ... but has been advanced primarily in
recent years by British and Australian scholars. The journal
Economy and Society has been a principal site for the development
of this approach, which is frequently referred to as the "governmentality" literature. While "governmentality" refers to a particular technology of government that emerges in the eighteenth
century, the term is more generally used to refer to the approach
adopted in its study. The approach is characterized by two primary
characteristics. The first is a stress on the dispersal of "government," that is, on the idea that government is not a preserve of "the
state" but is carried out at all level and sites in societies-including
the self government of individuals .... The second is the
deployment of an analytic stance that favors "how" questions over
"why" questions. In other words it favors accounts in terms of how
government of a certain kind becomes possible: in what manner it is
thought up by planners, using what concepts; how it is intended to
be translated into practice, using what combination of means?
Only secondarily is it concerned with accounts that seek to explain
the nature of
government-in the sense of understanding
16
government as the effect of other events.
In Foucaultand Law, a book I published with Alan Hunt in 1994,
governmentality is tackled thusly:
The Foucault who inspires this part of our book is the Foucault who
is interested in government alongside power, the Foucault who uses
the neologism "governmentality" to capture the dramatic changes
in techniques of government developed in the western world from
the eighteenth century onwards. This may not be the most popular
15. DEAN, supra note 10, is excellent. See also FOUCAULT AND POLITICAL REASON:
LIBERALISM, NEO-LIBERALISM AND RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT (Andrew Barry et al.
eds., 1996); GAVIN KENDALL & GARY WICKHAM, USING FOUCAULT'S METHODS (1999);
GOVERNING AUSTRALIA (Mitchell Dean & Barry Hindess eds., 1998); NIKOLAS ROSE,
GOVERNING THE SOUL (1989); THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY

(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991); Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life, 19
ECON. & SOC'Y 1 (1990); Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, Political Power Beyond the State.
Problematicsof Government, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. 173 (1992).

16. Pat O'Malley, ImaginingInsurance Risk, Thrift and IndustrialLife Insurance in Britain,
5 CONN. INS. L.J. 676, 679 n.7 (1999).
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Foucault, but we take it to be the most rewarding Foucault for
those, like ourselves, interested in new directions for the sociology
of law. We are inspired not just by Foucault's direct discussion of
governmentality... but also and more importantly by the work of
others heavily influenced by Foucault's work on this notion which is
contributing to a distinctive approach ....We offer a sketch of

governmentality here.., such that we allow the reader some
insight into the richness of the Foucaultian work in the area ....In
simple terms, governmentality is the dramatic expansion in the
scope of government, featuring an increase in the number and size
of the governmental calculation mechanisms, which began about
the middle of the eighteenth century and is still continuing. In this
way, governmentality is about the growth of modern government
and the growth of modern bureaucracies.., the moment where
Foucault meets Weber ....
This simple definition is useful up to a
point, but it does not capture enough of the subtlety of Foucault's
concept. It does not, for example, allow us to follow closely
Foucault's periodisation. While government and its mechanisms
have indeed boomed from the eighteenth century onwards, this
period is hardly unique in the history of widespread, sophisticated
governmental techniques. Ancient Egypt, ancient Greece, ancient
Rome and many examples from both the Western and Eastern
worlds in the period from the fall of Rome to the middle of the
eighteenth century all mark boom times for just such government;
all these examples could be regarded as instances of governTo
mentality were we to use only this simple definition ....
enhance this simple definition such that the nuances of Foucault's
governmentality are more easily recognized, we suggest a series of
interconnected definitions around the following themes: the
emergence of the reason of state; the emergence of the problem of
population; the birth of modern political economy; the move
towards liberal securitisation; and the emergence of the human
sciences as new mechanisms of calculation. 7
All this adds up, I suggest, to a position whereby law is treated as
another means of and site of government, a position which refuses the
idea of law as some special area that influences government as an
external force. Law, by this way of thinking, cannot possibly be
reduced to a text or set of texts, to something that needs interpretation, or indeed to anything. As with other objects studied under
governmentality, legal objects must be studied simply as discrete
practices of government, in the broad sense Foucault understands it"Practices of government.., do not form those types of totalities in
which the parts are expressions or instances of the whole. Rather,

17. ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF
LAW As GOVERNANCE 76 (1994).
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they should be approached as composed of heterogeneous elements
having diverse historical trajectories .... "18
II. FOUCAULT'S WORK Is NOT HERMENEUTICS

Dreyfus and Rabinow offer a particularly strong indication of
Foucault's distance from hermeneutics by starting with "his earliest
published work, the introduction to an essay by Binswanger" (a
Heideggerian analyst). In this piece, they tell us, "Foucault clearly
identified himself with the tradition of hermeneutic ontology which
originated in Heidegger's Being and Time. As his interests in the
social effects rather than the implicit meaning of everyday practices
developed, however, Foucault simply left the concerns of the
hermeneutic position behind."' 19
Dreyfus and Rabinow back this up with other points against the
proposition that Foucault might be read as sympathetic to, or in the
tradition of, hermeneutics:
He has sought.., to avoid the attempt of commentary as read
off the implicit meaning of social practices as well as the
hermeneutic unearthing of a different
and deeper meaning of which
20
social actors are only dimly aware.
We think Foucault is implying... that we cannot simply
assume that there are deep meanings to investigate just because our
culture tells us there are. This is just another way2 1of saying that the
notion of deep meaning is a cultural construction.
Dreyfus and Rabinow add to this last point in saying that
Foucault is thereby showing us that "man as object and subject" is
produced "in our objectified, meaning-obsessed society. 22
Franqois Wahl, in exploring the possibility that Foucault is
beyond philosophy, even goes so far as to suggest that Foucault is
much more concerned to study philosophy as an "archaeological"
object than to be a philosopher.2 3 He suggests that Foucault's
archaeological approach is certainly not philosophy in the way that
18. DEAN, supra note 10, at 29. For an indication of the direction of, and a bibliography
for, the emerging governmentality sociolegal literature, see Nikolas Rose & Mariana Valverde,
Governed by Law?, 7 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 541 (1998).
19. DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 1, at xxiii.
20. Id. at xix-xx.
21. Id. at xxi.
22. Id. Grahame Thompson also captures the Foucaultian opposition to "deep" meanings
well. See Grahame Thompson, Causality in Economics: Rhetorical Ethic or Positivist Empiric?,
27 QUALITY & QUANTITY 47,65-66 (1993).
23. Franqois Wahl, Inside or Outside Philosophy, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: PHILOSOPHER
65, 65-69 (Timothy Armstrong ed. & trans., 1992).
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hermeneutics is philosophy-"held in place by the chain of
meaning"-though he goes on to propose that Foucault is 24 a
philosopher within a very definite view of the history of philosophy.
Of course, in relying on Dreyfus and Rabinow's argument to the
extent I am, I am duty-bound to point out that they are equally
adamant that Foucault should not be seen as a structuralist or as a
phenomenologist either (two strong possibilities for those twentiethcentury thinkers who are tempted by hermeneutics but reject it). In
saying that Foucault was always beyond hermeneutics, Dreyfus and
Rabinow argue that Foucault was never a structuralist (even though
he was tempted by structuralism) because he never totalized
discourse: "Foucault never posited a universal theory of discourse,
but rather sought to describe the historical forms taken by discursive
practices. '"

Not a discourse theorist, not a structuralist, not a phenomenologist, and certainly not a practitioner of hermeneutics. So, the
question leaps out, how can Foucault's work be characterized? It is
obviously a tough question. Dreyfus and Rabinow set out to answer
it in a way many have sought to follow: Foucault builds his own
distinctive approach. They tell us that in doing this, Foucault takes
structuralism and hermeneutics as steppingstones of sorts: "Foucault
is able to show how in our culture human beings have become the
sort of objects and subjects structuralism and hermeneutics discover
and analyze. '' 26 In adding to this, Dreyfus and Rabinow assert that
hermeneutics, along with structuralism and phenomenology, has
failed to live up to its promise as a means of learning from the study
of human beings. "Foucault offers, in our opinion, elements of a
'27
coherent and powerful alternative means of understanding.
In discussing what Foucault actually does in getting away from
structuralism and hermeneutics, Dreyfus and Rabinow are adamant
that he "never gives up his earlier position that social institutions
influence discursive practices," though he does modify it to a certain
extent in The Archaeology of Knowledge. Via his archaeological
method, they argue, Foucault "proposes to treat all that is said in the
human sciences as a 'discourse-object.' ' 28 This method "must remain
neutral as to the truth and meaning of the discursive systems it
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 76-77.
DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 1, at vii-viii.
Id. at viii.
Id. at xiii.
Id. at xx.
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studies, [it] is not another theory about the relation of words and
29
things.
Dreyfus and Rabinow admit to seeing flaws in Foucault's
archaeological method,30 but they show how he rescues much from
that method:
Foucault abandons only the attempt to work out a theory of rulegoverned systems of discursive practices. As a technique, archaeology serves genealogy. As a method of isolating discourse objects,
it serves to distance and defamiliarize the serious discourse of the
human sciences. This, in turn, enables Foucault to raise the
genealogical questions: How are these discourses used? What role
do they play in society?3"
Dreyfus and Rabinow see Foucault's History of Sexuality Volume
One as a further instance of archaeology and genealogy working
together and pulling further away from hermeneutics. In this book,
they say, "Foucault challenges the hermeneutic belief in deep
meaning by tracing the emergence of sexual confession and relating it
to practices of social domination."32
Dreyfus and Rabinow say that Foucault's alternative direction
"preserves the distancing effect of structuralism" and that it uses a
key aspect of hermeneutics- "that the investigator is always situated
and must understand the meaning of his cultural practices from within
them. ' 33 They add, noting that Foucault was trained in both Husserl's
transcendental phenomenology and the "existential counter-movement led by Heidegger in Germany and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in
France, ' 34 that Foucault's new direction, like both structuralism and
hermeneutics, is also a reaction to phenomenology and an attempt to
"transcend the Kantian subject/object division" and to "eliminate the
' 35
Husserlian conception of a meaning-giving transcendental subject.
So, Foucault's "new direction" owes a debt to at least some
aspects of that which he is rejecting, yet this direction is markedly
different than the other positions that grew from that which he is
rejecting, especially, as I am at pains to show, Gadamerian
29. Id.
30. Id. at xx-xxi.
31. Id. at xxi. For other attempts to show the links between archaeology and genealogy,
see KENDALL & WICKHAM, supra note 15, at 24-34; Phil Bevis et al., Archaeologizing
Genealogy: Michel Foucaultand the Economy of Austerity, in FOUCAULT'S NEW DOMAINS, at
xxi (Mike Gane & Terry Johnson eds., 1993).
32. DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 1, at xxi.
33. Id. at vii.
34. Id. at xvii.
35. Id. at xv.
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philosophical hermeneutics. I suggest the key to understanding this
might be the fact that Foucault's reading of Heidegger is vastly
different from Gadamer's reading. As such, we should bear in mind
that while Foucaultian thinking and Gadamerian thinking both have a
Heideggerian flavor, this does not suggest a back-door link between
Foucaultians and Gadamerians. Let's explore the "Heideggerian
flavor" in Foucault a little further.
The theme of a Heideggerian influence on Foucault, as
summarized by Dreyfus and Rabinow, is taken much further by
Dreyfus alone in a later piece. In that essay, Dreyfus sets out to see
how far he can push a comparison between Heidegger's Dasein and
Foucault's power.36 He offers a quote from Foucault's final interview:
"For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher ....
My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading
of Heidegger. '3 7 Dreyfus also quotes this interview to show that
Foucault's heavy debt to Nietzsche is also a debt to Heidegger: "It is
possible that if I had not read Heidegger, I would not have read
Nietzsche. I had tried to read Nietzsche in the fifties but Nietzsche
alone did not appeal to me-whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger, that
3
was a philosophical shock!"
In presenting his understanding of Being, Heidegger, Dreyfus
says, is interested in our understanding of Being, up to the point that
this understanding,
is embodied in the tools, language and institutions of a society and
in each person growing up in that society. These shared practices
into which we are socialized provide a background understanding
of what counts as real, on the basis of which we can direct our
actions towards particular things and people. Thus the understanding of Being creates what Heidegger calls a clearing ....
Heidegger calls the unnoticed way that the clearing both limits and
opens up what can be done, its "unobtrusive governance. 39
Dreyfus reads much of Foucault's account of power "to be
getting at a similar social clearing with an emphasis on the way
embodied, everyday practices produce, perpetuate and delimit what
36. Hubert Dreyfus, On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger and
Foucault,in MICHEL FOUCAULT: PHILOSOPHER 80, 80 (Timothy Armstrong ed. & trans., 1992).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 80-81.
39. Id. at 81. This point coincides with some of those contained in the pointedly
Foucaultian account of governance I have developed with Jeff Malpas. See Jeff Malpas & Gary
Wickham, Governance and the World: From Joe DiMaggio to Michel Foucault, 3 UTS REV. 91
(1998); Jeff Malpas & Gary Wickham, Governance and Failure: On the Limits of Sociology, 31
AUST. & N.Z. J. SOC. 37 (1995).
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people can think and do. ' 40 Dreyfus also notes here that "power" is
perhaps a misnomer for this phenomenon." He adds: "For Foucault,
as for Heidegger on Being, power is neither a fixed entity nor an
institution. "42
Continuing this point, Dreyfus quotes Foucault (in an essay
called The Subject and Power) thus:
Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist
universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist.
It is a total
Power exists only when it is put into action ....
structure of actions brought to bear on possible actions ....
Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or
the linking of one to the other than a question of government ....
in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action
To govern,
43
of others.

Dreyfus, I argue, is on to something here-the Heideggerian
Foucault he is carefully drawing out is a Foucault not at all happy
with standard treatments of the notion of power, a thinker seeking
more to account for the complexities of governing (in its broadest
sense) than to expound yet another account of power-as-repression.
This is a Foucault heading in a very different direction than that
chosen by Gadamer and the Gadamerians, a direction that eventually
became, among other things, the governmentality approach.
Dreyfus argues that Foucault speaks of power in the History of
Sexuality Volume One in "Heideggerian terms" -especially in saying
that we need to "define the conditions in which human beings
'problematize' what they are, what they do, and the world in which
they live." 44 In attempting to establish the point that Foucault is very
Heideggerian in thinking about "a receptivity to being," Dreyfus
turns to a quote from Foucault's The Use of Pleasure: "analyzing not
behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their 'ideologies,' but the
problematizations through which beings offers itself as having to be
thought-and the practices on the basis of which these problema45
tizations are formed."

40. Dreyfus, supra note 36, at 81.
41. This coincides with some of the objections/qualifications I have presented with each of
Alan Hunt and Gavin Kendall to Foucault's handling of power. See HUNT & WICKHAM, supra
note 17, at 80-87; KENDALL & WICKHAM, supra note 15, at 47-56.
42. Dreyfus, supra note 36, at 81.
43. Id. at 82.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Note that here power has become problematizations of
governing, that is, it is now also covering the thinking necessary to
govern.
As well, Dreyfus traces Foucault's and Heidegger's common
starting point in pre-Socratic Greece. Heidegger, Dreyfus argues,
showed that while the clearing was not present in pre-Socratic
thought, neither was it denied. Heidegger reads the "truth of being or
alathea" as "unconcealment" and says "this understanding was lost
when Socrates and Plato took Being to be the ground of phenomena,
and truth to be the correspondence of propositions to an independent
46
reality."
Dreyfus notes that Foucault's references to pre-Socratic Greece
are "much sketchier" but argues that "he too points to the emergence
of theoretical knowing as the great turning point in our history. The
pragmatic and poetic discourse of early Greek civilization was
destroyed by the rise of theory. '47 He quotes Foucault (in L'Ordre du
Discours) to this effect: "The Sophists were routed... [From] the
time of the great Platonic division onwards, the [Platonic] will to truth
has had its own history. '48
Dreyfus continues this point by quoting Foucault from The Birth
of the Clinic and from History of Sexuality Volume One to show what

a difference this change made to the practice of medicine and the
understanding of sexuality: on medicine-"When Hippocrates had
reduced medicine to a system, observation was abandoned and
philosophy introduced into medicine"; on sexuality-"the West has
managed ... to annex sex to a field of rationality ....[W]e are

'49
accustomed to such 'conquests' since the Greeks.
Furthermore, Dreyfus says, while Foucault has little to say about
Greek philosophy per se, where Heidegger obviously has much to
say, nonetheless, their "concerns converge upon the transformation
which issues in the modern world and our current understanding of
human beings."50
Dreyfus takes the shift in the interpretation of the role of "man"
as another point at which the "parallel" between Foucault and
Heidegger "comes into sharp focus. ' 51 He draws out the strong
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 84.
Id.
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similarities between Foucault's account of the rise of "man" offered
in The Order of Things, especially as it is "brilliantly" presented
through an analysis of Velasquez's Las Meninas, and Heidegger's
account of the "radical transformation in our understanding of being
which took place in the seventeenth century." 2 After citing
Descartes as an instigator of this shift, he quotes Heidegger (in Being
and Time) to support his point about the ground shared by Heidegger
and Foucault: "What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that
it only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents
'53
and sets forth.
I have surely said enough to establish the point that Foucault, in
rejecting philosophical hermeneutics, established a viable alternative.
That this viable alternative led, at least in part, to the governmentality
approach is assumed. I move on now to the promised discussion of a
small sample of Gadamerian literature, concentrating on advancing
my argument that Foucaultians and Gadamerians have little in
common.
III. A BRIEF LOOK THROUGH GADAMERIAN EYES OFFERS No
GLIMPSE OF FOUCAULT

Mootz claims that Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics is an
approach based on "the ontological claim that all understanding
results from a decentering 'fusion of horizons' in which a 'prejudiced'
individual confronts a text or other person in an 'experience' that
5' 4
disrupts her presumed insularity.
We have already seen evidence that this is not a direction that
could be called Foucaultian. Shortly I add to this some points about
the differences between the understanding of the subject contained in
this summary statement and the Foucaultian understanding of the
subject.
Another hint of this difference is found in a summary point
offered by Aylesworth:
Gadamer believes that the human sciences, insofar as they
comprise a body of methods and techniques, are not indistinguishable from technology and its totalizing agenda. Philosophical

52.
53.
54.
and the

Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 84.
Francis J. Mootz III, Law in Flux: PhilosophicalHermeneutics, Legal Argumentation,
NaturalLaw Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311,314 (1999).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:913

hermeneutics, on the other hand, offers a more fundamental
understanding of experience in terms of practical reason.55
An "experiencing" subject is, it seems, central to Gadamerian
concerns, while it is certainly not central to Foucaultian govern56
mentality work.
Remembering that Foucault is not and never was a theorist of
discourse, we should not be fooled into thinking Gadamerian remarks
about language are similar to the Foucaultian approach to language
even where they appear so. Some of Smith's points about Gadamer
on the statement 57 may look like some of Foucault's points in The
Archaeology of Knowledge (or even The Order of Things), but when
we take into account that Smith approaches the statement as a
component of language where Foucault approaches it as a component
of discourse, we should realize that these are two very different
ventures. To understand this point fully, it is necessary to accept that
for Foucault and Foucaultians discourse is not language (as it clearly
is for Gadamerians).
This point is made very well in a Griffith University discussion
document by Ian Hunter circulated in the early 1980s-Michel
Foucault:Discourse Versus Language.8 Hunter argues that,
Foucault's reformulation of the concept of discourse derives from
his attempts to provide histories of knowledge which are not
histories of what men and women have thought. Foucault's
histories are not histories of ideas, opinions or influences nor are
they histories of the way in which economic, political and social

contexts have shaped ideas or opinions. Rather they are reconstructions of the material conditions of thought or "knowledges."
They represent an attempt to produce what Foucault calls an
archaeology of the material conditions of thought/knowledges,

conditions which are
'59 not reducible to the idea of "consciousness" or
the idea of "mind."

55. Gary E. Aylesworth, Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Confronting Gadamer and Ricoeur, in
GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS

68,68 (Hugh J. Silverman ed., 1991).

56. It has to be admitted that when Gadamerians turn to certain particular practices that
do not traditionally feature accounts of experiencing subjects, they are able to leave this plank
out of their building materials. I have in mind, especially, Heelan's very detailed and fascinating
account of what a hermeneutic philosophy of natural science might look like. See Patrick A.
Heelan, Hermeneutical Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Science, in GADAMER AND
HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55-an account to which I return.
57. P. Christopher Smith, Plato As Impulse and Obstacle in Gadamer's Development of
HermeneuticalTheory, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at 23, 28-33.
58. Ian Hunter, Michel Foucault: Discourse Versus Language (1984, unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). While this paper has never been published, some points in it
were later aired in IAN HUNTER, CULTURE AND GOVERNMENT: THE EMERGENCE OF
LITERARY EDUCATION 20 (1988).
59. Hunter, supra note 58, at 45.
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In expanding upon this, Hunter goes on to cash out Foucault's
metaphor that discourse has no inside (that is, no inside in thought)
and no outside (that is, no outside in things). Foucault, Hunter tells
us, aims to fragment "thinking," not to totalize it as "thought" or
"language." In stressing that there is no "inside," Foucault is urging
us to drop the idea of a thinking process that can be found external to
and prior to the use of words and symbols so as to make their use
possible.60
Hunter is showing us Foucault's notion of discourse as it goes
about producing aspects of life. A linguistic version of discourse
could not give us access to these objects. In explicating the "other"
side of Foucault's treatment of discourse-that it has no "outside"Hunter says:
[O]ur use of words is not governed by the familiar notion of
"reference".... [I]t is the use of words (that is, the operation of
60. Id. In developing this, Hunter combines some of Foucault's insights with some of
Wittgenstein's in the first of two examples:
[P]rior to our use of words we do not have mental acts/processes which are then
"expressed" in words... [for example, consider] a simple mathematical discourse, a
simple algebraic formula for expanding a series: y = 2x + 5; if x = 2, then the series runs
9, 23, 51, etc. Now at any point in the expansion of this series, what does it mean to
"think" of the next number? Surely it means to perform the calculation (the discursive
operation) which results in that number. There is no question of this discursive
operation expressing my thought of the next number, a thought which exists
independently of the operation of the mathematical discourse. For this to be the case
it would have to be possible to think of the next number without performing the
calculation. And this is not possible ....It is unintelligible because performing the
calculation materially produces the criteria for what we will call "the next number."
One doesn't think of the next number by some general faculty of recognition prior to
being equipped-in a very straightforward sense, in schools-with the techniques of
algebra.
Id.
Hunter draws on Foucault's account of the discourse of confession in The History of
Sexuality Volume One to build his other example:
Here, Foucault is making the same general point, namely, that consciousness of "sins
of the flesh" is not something that exists in the mind. Rather it is something that
appears, historically, on the surface of an organization of techniques and
statements ....Foucault demonstrates that confession, at the time of the church
fathers, wasn't a particularly important church ritual.
Indeed, up until the
Renaissance, confession was more or less an annual event for Catholics. Foucault
records that during the Renaissance a pressure emerges for confession to become
much more frequent, to become (eventually) a weekly phenomenon, and he also
records that what counts as a confession changes. The rules for making a confession,
the structure of the confessional, the text put about for both penitent and confessors to
learn, alter. And they alter in a way that privileges what we would now call "sins of
sexuality." During the Renaissance sins of sexuality become the cardinal sins, the
"league ladder" of sins alters. Once gluttony and sloth were up there with sex but
during the Renaissance sex becomes the big one and the important thing is that not
only does sex as a sin, an act (as in adultery and fornication) become extremely
important but also and for the first time, the possibility that one might sin in thought
becomes important.
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definite forms of calculation... ) that determines what will count as
the properties of objects. For example, it would be fruitless to try
to ground the meaning of y = 2x + 4 by pointing to the numbers
that are its object. The reason 61being that operating the formula is
how one points to the numbers.
Hunter stresses again that Foucault is not totalizing here, but
fragmenting- fragmenting reference. "He is attempting to break up
'reference' into domains of reference, domains established by the
operation of particular forms of calculation and types of statement
that organize the diverse spaces in which particular types of object
'62
can appear.
This makes it easier to see that only those Gadamerians prepared
to criticize Gadamer's "downgrading of the statement '63 can be
thought of as being even vaguely on the same page as Foucaultians.
Davey is such a Gadamerian. He provides a thoughtful account of
Gadamer's complex rejection of naive ahistorical treatments of
statements, 64 but in doing so goes so far as to argue, drawing heavily
on Pannenberg: "Contrary to Gadamer's belief that the statement
distorts meaning by obscuring the background horizon of commitments and assumptions upon which any discourse depends,
Pannenberg argues that it is precisely the statement that allows 'the
'65
infinity of the unsaid' to come into view.
A turn to the Gadamerian commitment to the "conversation
model" yields similar results. Mootz promotes this model thus:
Gadamer's principal philosophical claim is that our truthful relation
to the world subtends but is not exhausted by modem technicalempirical science and that the Enlightenment picture of a monadic,
prejudice-free subject decoding the world of objects must therefore
be viewed as a mirage ....His focus is on the seamless web of truth

and meaning that we constantly renew simply in the course of
living ....From this perspective, interpretation is not just an

activity designed to bring the being of certain
objects into sharper
66
focus; it is our fundamental mode of existing.

This looks promising for Foucaultians, with its focus on creating
a sharper focus on the being of certain objects, though when Mootz
selects Gadamer's treatment of the practice of conversation as
61. Id.
62 Id.
63. R. Nicholas Davey, A Response to P. ChristopherSmith, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at 42, 53.
64. Id. at 50-57.
65. Id. at 55.
66. Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Theory, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 491,500 (1998).

2000]

FOUCA ULT AND GADAMER: LIKE APPLES AND ORANGES

929

emblematic of his (Gadamer's) philosophical hermeneutics, he
inadvertently turns away from a potential Foucaultian approach. He
uses the following quote from Gadamer's Truth and Method in
positioning his promotion of the conversational model:
Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it
belongs to every true conversation that each person opens himself
to the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes
himself into the other to such an extent
67 that he understands not the
particular individual but what he says.
Mootz reads this, alongside other similar passages, as "an
' 68
ontological claim about the nature of hermeneutical understanding."
Gadamer's "model" of conversation, Mootz tells us, is central to his
method of dealing with texts: "Gadamer seriously intends the claim
that interpreting a text involves entering a conversation with
it ....[T]here is no ahistorical text-in-itself that can be applied, but
rather only a horizontal text that meets an interpreter in a dialogical
'69
encounter within a particular context.
For Foucaultians, the conversation model is a diversion, a false
lead in any investigation seeking to think in new ways about the
object of that investigation and its relation to other objects. A textfocused formula7 0 based on the idea of a fixed understanding of the
centrality of conversation is bound not to be where Foucaultians are
heading.71
Where Gadamer and Gadamerians seem to take
conversation and dialogue as ontological givens, Foucaultians want to
view them solely as objects to be investigated. Foucaultians cannot
be tempted by Gadamer's entreaty: "If language has its authentic life
only in conversation, then the Platonic dialogue will awaken a living
discussion now as before, and will achieve the fertile fusion of all

67. Id. at 501.
68. Id. at 502.
69. Id. at 503.
70. Aylesworth's suggestion that Gadamer is more text-obsessed than was Dilthey"Gadamer is more in agreement with Romantic hermeneutics.. . than with Dilthey, who thinks
of the text as the object to be deciphered"-is more grist for my mill, though not, I think, a
reason for Foucaultians to seek to align themselves with Dilthey rather than with Gadamer (no
models of hermeneutics are particularly attractive to Foucaultians, though some may be more
attractive than others). Aylesworth, supra note 55, at 64.
71. Jeff Minson is even more harsh in distancing the Foucaultian approach from the
Gadamerian approach, especially when it comes to investigating politics. See Jeff Minson,
Ascetics and the Demands of Participation,9 POL. SCI. NEWSL. 2027 (1998), in which he writes,
"The beginning of wisdom.., is to bracket off that epitome of the romantic fantasy of politics as
an interminable beautiful conversation: the normally privileged notion of 'dialogue."'

CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:913

horizons in which, questioning and searching, we must find our way in
'
our own world. 72
But, you may reasonably ask, what about the things Gadamer
and Foucault share, like a rejection of the Enlightenment heritage
and with it both neo-Kantianism and Cartesianism, and more than a
passing indebtedness to Heidegger? As we have already seen, in the
case of the Heidegger debt, sharing things does not in any way mean
using them in the same way. I could well share golf clubs with Tiger
Woods, but, alas, our uses of them would quickly lead people to
forget that they were the same clubs, so inconsequential would this
fact be.
So while Gadamer, according to Mootz, is pointedly challenging
"the Enlightenment model of a disinterested observer gathering data
about an entirely distinct external world, ' 73 he is doing so to further
the conversation model: the "hermeneutical experience" involved
here "draws upon the familiar experience of a conversation ....[A]I1
understanding occurs as the product of the give-and-take experiences
of the interpreter within a given historical and social situation. '' 74 As
we have seen, there's nothing Foucaultian about this model.
In taking us through some of the ways in which his work was
influenced by Heidegger, Gadamer says Heidegger's move away from
"academic philosophy" -"the history of problems in neo-kantianism
and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology" -led him (Gadamer)
to see links between "the radicality of Heidegger's energetic
questioning" and "the ancient task of ethics. ' 75 From here, Gadamer
says, "The question I asked myself was how one could speak of an
ethics in Plato's adoption of the Socratic question and Socratic
dialectic. I attempted to clarify this through phenomenological
methods. ' 76 He adds, "I then found myself confronted with a
problem that would later lead me to a fundamental problem of
'77
hermeneutics - the linguisticality of understanding.
72. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gadamer on Gadamer, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS,
supra note 55, at 13, 19.
73. Mootz, supra note 54, at 314-15.
74. Id. at 315.
75. Gadamer, supra note 72, at 15.
76. Id. at 16.
77. Id. Minson's Foucaultian point on ethics might well be considered here. After
asserting that the hermeneutics-based notion of dialogue presupposes that only such a mode of
exchange can have ethical dimensions, Minson offers a slight qualification and adds a rhetorical
question:
I do not suggest that political romanticism is in play whenever a call for dialogue is
heard. But, in that case, might there not be modalities of discussion in which the
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Gadamer seems to be suggesting that Heidegger led him to
hermeneutics, via a sophisticated philological study of various aspects
of Greek understandings of knowledge, by way of phenomenology.
This suggestion is supported by Gadamer when, in discussing "the
special hermeneutical problem of what the written retrieval and
repeated awakening of the figure of Socrates means in Plato's writing,
years and decades after Socrates' death," he says, "What was
imparted to me by Heidegger's introduction to Aristotle's thought in
ethics, rhetoric, physics, and metaphysics had to be put to a special
kind of test in the Platonic dialogue."7 8
This is all well and good and a sound basis for a healthy
Gadamerian approach to various investigations (including those of a
sociolegal nature), but it must surely raise still more doubts in any
Foucaultian's mind that this Heidegger is the same one who inspired,
even if only in part, the Foucaultian approach I sketched earlier.
Foucaultians could never treat "Heidegger's introduction to
Aristotle's thought in ethics, rhetoric, physics, and metaphysics" as a
step on the road to the conversation model, but would rather treat it
as an introduction to certain objects of investigation, that is, as an aid
to help us "think differently" about ethics, rhetoric, physics, and
metaphysics by way of undermining any authority they have gathered
over the years. 79 Heidegger would certainly not lead Foucaultians to
support this authority, as he seems to lead Gadamer to do.
Smith inadvertently highlights differences between, on the one
hand, Nietzsche's and Heidegger's influence on Gadamer and, on the
other, the influence of these two thinkers on Foucault when he writes,
"Gadamer, who comes to Plato with the hermeneutical concern of the
interpreter's dialogical encounter with the 'other' of the text
uppermost in his mind, is able to see another side to him that his
eremitic critics, Nietzsche and Heidegger, miss. ' 80 Perhaps they did
not miss anything, perhaps they simply looked at these matters in a
different way, a way not encumbered by such a strong commitment to
hermeneutics, a way that Foucault has since taken up and developed.

political-romantic criteria for dialogue are lacking, yet where discussion is not, either in
its methods or its aims, devoid of ethical value?
He goes on to discuss what such a "procedural" ethics might look like-reliability, following
meeting procedure, etc. Minson, supra note 71, at 27.
78. Gadamer, supra note 72, at 17.
79. Id.
80. Smith, supra note 57, at 34.
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Davey, in criticizing Smith, offers a glimpse of a Gadamerian
reading of Heidegger that appears closer to the Foucaultian reading
of his work. He says, "Smith eschews any criticism of the conversational model of hermeneutic understanding Gadamer allegedly
derives from the structural character of Plato's dialogues."' ' He goes
on:
What Christopher Smith does not make plain, whereas Gadamer
most certainly does, is that the conversational model of hermeneutic understanding has a specific philosophical entailment,
namely, a devaluation of the status of the propositional statement
or assertion.82
Is this "devaluation of the status of the propositional statement" an
echo of the Foucault of The Archaeology of Knowledge?
Developing his line of criticism of Smith, Davey offers some
quotes from Truth and Method in support of his summary of three
themes-"language as the medium of hermeneutical experience,
language as determination of the hermeneutic object, and language as
the determination of the hermeneutic act. '83 In doing so, he suggests
he is drawing out "the spirit of Heidegger."8 4 He argues from here
that, "A close reading of sections 31 to 34 of Being and Time reveals
that language is fundamental to Heidegger's existential hermeneutic."85
Now Foucault has disappeared. As I argue above, with much
help from Hunter, it is not language that is fundamental to Foucault
(not even the Foucault of The Archaeology of Knowledge and The
Order of Things), it is the notion of discourse as developed in a very
non-linguistic manner. Foucault is obviously taking something else
from Heidegger, or at least he is understanding Heidegger's basic
concepts very differently. As we have already seen, one of the more
provocative readings of Foucault from within the Foucaultian camp
(by Dreyfus) actually reads Heidegger's Dasein as a concept that
directly parallels Foucault's treatment of power. How very different
this is from Davey's understanding of Dasein as derived from a
linguistically-related notion of discourse: "Dasein-thenature of our
being-in-the-world as creatures who understand-is constituted by
discourse."86
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Davey, supra note 63, at 43.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
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Another possible route for a link between Gadamer and
Foucault is suggested by Aylesworth. This one too goes through the
town of Heidegger, but here the vehicle is Ricoeur:
Where Gadamer develops a dialogical model of interpretation, in
which the text is a "thou" with whom we are engaged in
conversation, Ricoeur insists upon the reflective distance of the text
as a linguistic object. This entails a broader difference in their
understanding of the relation between philosophical hermeneutics
For Gadamer,
and the practices of the human sciences.
philosophical hermeneutics is more fundamental than the methods
of the Geisteswissenschaften, and provides a corrective for the
methodological alienation of their subject matter. Ricoeur, on the
other hand, believes that philosophical hermeneutics must serve an
epistemological function vis-a-vis the human sciences, 7and must
incorporate their critical practices into its own discourse.
The possible link is, alas, another detour, inasmuch as Foucault,
while closer to Ricoeur in this way than to Gadamer, is much more
radical still, imposing a greater "reflective distance" again, to the
point where the human sciences themselves become his objects of
investigation. Similarly, in regard to the status of subjects, when
Aylesworth says that Ricoeur understands that "the identity of the
subject is not fixed, but enlarged through the encounter with the
text," 88 I can treat this as further evidence in support of my point that
Ricoeur cannot quite provide a link between Gadamer and Foucault.
This position too does not go far enough-for Foucaultians it is
certainly true that the subject does not have a fixed identity, but it so
true that Foucaultians would not dare suggest that subjects can be
"enlarged" by texts, or by anything else, as this is already to give them
too much of an identity, something which lies waiting for a text to
come along. For Foucaultians, having no fixed identity means having
no identity other than that which is produced in particular situations;
89
there is nothing there, waiting for anything.
This difference between Gadamerians and Foucaultians in
handling the status of the subject can be seen again in regard to
discontinuity. Aylesworth says, "Gadamer suggests that one of our
most fundamental experiences of time is that of a discontinuity, or a

87. Aylesworth, supra note 55, at 63.
88. Id. at 73.
89. Lawlor, in arguing, contra Aylesworth, that there are in fact more similarities between
Ricoeur and Gadamer than there are differences, only adds fuel to my fire: if Ricoeur is in close
agreement with Gadamer, he is no use as a bridge between Gadamerians and Foucaultians.
Leonard Lawlor, The Dialectical Unity of Hermeneutics: On Ricoeur and Gadamer, in
GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at 74, 82.
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becoming other." 9 Of course Foucault's notion of discontinuity could
not be about a "fundamental experience," as there are no fundamental subjects to serve as vehicles for such things as "fundamental
experiences. "91

Risser offers another possible link between Gadamerians and
Foucaultians when he argues that some "poststructuralist" work,
especially that of Barthes, which sees itself as an "advance over
hermeneutics" actually misunderstands "contemporary hermeneutics":
[Flor contemporary hermeneutics also insists, in its own way, on
effacing the markings which serve as borders to a text. In the case
of the border of signature, of author, this is most obvious. For
Gadamer, the normative notion of author's intention represents
only an empty space, for what is fixed in writing always frees itself
for a new relationship. 92
As such, Risser provides more than a few hints that the
poststructuralist enterprise and Gadamer's enterprise have a lot in
common. This would be ammunition for an argument that claimed
common ground between a poststructuralist Foucault and Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics, but I am pointedly not mounting
such an argument. In being indebted, as I am, to Dreyfus and
Rabinow's argument that Foucaultian work is neither hermeneutics
nor structuralism precisely because it follows its own direction, I feel
safe in adopting the position that Foucaultian work is no more
poststructuralist than it is structuralist.
Cook, responding to Risser, adds that poststructuralism and
philosophical hermeneutics are related because of their debt to
Heidegger (and Husserl).93 However, this can make no difference for
my argument, remembering my suggestion that the Heidegger drawn

90. Id.
91. It has to be added that there are odd occasions on which Gadamerians offer
formulations that are unequivocally close to Foucaultian formulations. For instance, when
Aylesworth summarizes Gadamer to the effect that discourse can be completely without the
"self," we seem to be on ground that is very much shared with Foucaultians: "For Gadamer,
philosophical hermeneutics is not an attempt to recover an individual 'self' from the
proliferation of discourses, but the preservation of a level of discourse that is ultimately selfless." Id. at 81. Compare this with Wahl's claim about Foucault's position in relation to
practices of sexuality: "The point is that the Self is nothing more than a form called into being
by the totality of these practices." Wahl, supra note 23, at 70.
92. James Risser, Reading the Text, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at
93, 94.
93. Deborah Cook, Reading Gadamer: A Response to Risser, in GADAMER AND
HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at 106, 107.
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on in the Foucaultian approach and that drawn on in the Gadamerian
approach may as well be two different Heideggers.
More tempting for my argument is Cook's attempt to bring
Derrida into the mix. 94 However, in a footnote she acknowledges that
while this move should create the space to also bring in Foucault, "It
is the author's belief... that such a comparison would substantially
undermine any attempt to find similarities between poststructuralism,
understood as a unified set of theories, and hermeneutics." 95 Enough
said.
Madison, too, looks into possible links between Gadamerian
hermeneutics and Derridean poststructuralism. In his case, however,
there is not even a hint that this may provide a route for stronger ties
between Gadamerians and Foucaultians as he assiduously sets up a
somewhat bizarre opposition between Gadamer and Derrida. He
places Derrida in what he calls the "Counter-Tradition" (in which he
also places the Pyrrhonists, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche)96 and then
proceeds to explain how he cannot really understand Derrida. It
seems, however, that he can understand him enough to claim that any
positive features of Derridean thinking are actually already positive
features of Gadamerian thinking, and on this note he completely
dismisses Derrida as a thinker absorbed by a negative philosophical
quest.97
Another possible source of a link between the two positions is a
shared opposition to Habermas. Nicholson positions Gadamer as the
winner of a long running debate between Gadamer and Habermas in
which Habermas argues for a neo-Marxist/critical theory rationalism
while Gadamer argues for philosophical hermeneutics. 98 Should we
94. Id. passim.
95. Id. at 288 n.4.
96. Gary B. Madison, Beyond Seriousness and Frivolity: A Gadamerian Response to
Deconstruction,in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at 119, 135.
97. Froman works hard to reposition Derrida in regard to Gadan r, in response to
Madison's attack. See Wayne J. Froman, L'Ecriture and Philosophical Hermeneutics, in
GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at 136.
Joel Weinsheimer is another
Gadamerian who considers Derrida's work more sympathetically than does Madison, focusing
on Derrida's treatment of the role of the dead metaphor in philosophy. See Joel Weinsheimer,
Gadamer's Metaphorical Hermeneutics, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at
181. However, neither Froman nor Weinsheimer do enough to rescue this potential line of
inquiry in our investigation of possible links between Gadamerians and Foucaultians. Hugh J.
Silverman in summarizing Descombes, takes a slightly different tack, suggesting that
Gadamerians are able to be "at once hermeneutic, analytic, and deconstructive." Hugh J.
Silverman, Interpreting the Interpretative Text, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS, supra note
55, at 269, 269. This may be so, but it does not bring the bulk of Gadamerians, nor Gadamer
himself, closer to a Foucaultian position.
98. Graeme Nicholson, Answers to Critical Theory, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS,
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then ask, is another possible similarity an antirationalism? We should
ask, but I do not think we can get far. I doubt that a similar stance
against Habermasian hyper-rationalism could do more than sit
alongside oppositions to neo-Kantianism and to Cartesianism as
similarities that ultimately do not do enough to overcome the big
differences between philosophical hermeneutics and the Foucaultian
approach. 99
IV. A FEW EXCEPTIONS?
Perhaps a more likely source of productive contact between
Gadamerians and Foucaultians involves rhetoric. Mootz develops a
thoughtful Gadamerian treatment of rhetoric for use in the analysis of
sociolegal objects.
In developing his approach, at least in one particular piece, 1E
Mootz confesses to some "presumptions."
Two of these are of
interest to us:
My thesis is that the interpretive turn in legal theory works as a
critique of legal positivism in at least one surprising way: by
reinvigorating (even if in a dramatically new form) the natural law
tradition. This thesis [involves some] presuppositions .... HansGeorg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics provides the most
sophisticated and persuasive account of the "interpretive turn" ...
[and] Gadamer's hermeneutics illuminates the activity of legal
practice and correlatively that legal theorists provide important
contextual work that reinforces Gadamer's philosophical themes. 101
These two "presumptions" immediately attest to the fact that, for
Mootz, hermeneutics needs to be handled as a source of "illumination" of sociolegal sites-illumination powered, it seems, by the
contexts produced by the sociolegal. To put this another way, I read
Mootz as telling sociolegal scholars that Gadamer can help them only
if they stick to careful interpretations of contexts they themselves
must provide.

supra note 55, at 151.
99. My doubt here is strengthened by the fact that Misgeld manages to find more
similarities between Gadamer and Habermas than does Nicholson, even though he eventually
acknowledges mainly differences between them.
See Dieter Misgeld, Modernity and
Hermeneutics:A Critical-TheoreticalRejoinder, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS, supra note
55, at 163.
100. Mootz, supra note 54, at 311.
101. Id. at 312-13.
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Mootz takes us further into the nexus between his version of
Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics and sociolegal studies when
he notes,
Today, the legal system-which is premised on the production and
interpretation of authoritative texts as sources of governing
authority-is a prominent venue for this hermeneutical experience,
since the performance and reception of speeches before all
competent citizens of the polis no longer occurs. Every attempt to
understand a legal text, Gadamer insists, is a function of applying
the text to the case at hand; thus he regards legal reasoning
1°2 as a
particularly vivid model of all hermeneutical understanding.
Expanding on the idea of understanding a legal exchange as a
conversation, Mootz adds, "An interpreter understands what a legal
text is saying by suppressing her subjective designs and allowing the
10
text to speak to the question posed by the case at hand.'

3

I have already argued that the text-focus of Gadamerians is a bar
to productive contact between them and most Foucaultians. But as
Mootz is taking us on a very particular sociolegal journey, I bear with
him.
Summarizing Gadamer's treatment of "the rhetoric of legal
argumentation," Mootz says, "Gadamer's hermeneutics is philosophical because it abandons the focus on methodological rules and
instead analyses the unitary hermeneutical situation that subtends all
human knowledge, including the methodologically-secured empirical
knowledge of positive science."' 0 4
Mootz stresses that the
Gadamerian approach necessarily "signals the tremendous importance of the rhetorical tradition."' 15 He develops this point by first
°6
discussing the importance of Vico to Gadamer's Truth and Method'
and then by discussing what Gadamer is trying to do in regard to
rhetoric more generally: "As one commentator recently concluded,
Gadamer is not advocating that we elevate rhetorical study over
philosophy as much as insisting on the rhetorical nature of all
humanistic inquiry, including philosophy.' 17 Mootz is particularly
concerned that we understand Gadamer's debt to ancient rhetoric:
"Gadamer relates ancient rhetoric to his inquiry into our premethodological, traditional complex of meanings ....Gadamer
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
ld. at

317.
318.
314.
315.
315-16.
316.
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argues that genuine rhetoric concerns the 'discovery and transmission
of insight and knowledge,' an event that he reminds us is exemplified
10 8
in the 'art of leading a conversation.
Is this ground that is actually shared by the Gadamerian
approach and the Foucaultian approach? To put a positive spin on it,
we can at least say that inasmuch as rhetoric can be broadly
understood as a tradition that favors persuasion over dogma,
construction over bedrock, interpretation over the imposition of
supposed fact, there may well be a commonality here. But we must
look further.
In discussing the way Gadamerian hermeneutics concentrates on
meanings produced by and through individual experiencing subjects
as they relate to one another and to texts, Mootz further emphasizes
the role of rhetoric: the interpreter acts in the manner described
above "rather than by charting in advance the line of inquiry, just as a
rhetorician must be attuned to her audience."'1 9 The interpreter must
"suppress her subjective aims [and] attend [to] the saying" of the
historically effective text as it is revealed in particular circumstances. 110 For example, Gadamer believes law holds authority
because it is the practice of hermeneutically appropriating governing
texts to current disputes.
The Foucaultian package under consideration would certainly
place the emphasis of the analyses differently, but, sticking to my
positive spin for the time being, it is reasonable to say that rhetoric's
pragmatic underpinnings can be counted as a vague family
resemblance between Gadamerian and Foucaultian approaches.
Mootz insightfully marries Gadamer to the pragmatic philosophy
of Chaim Perelman. He says that Gadamer and Perelman are each
"important contributors to this century's philosophical effort to
identify the deficiencies of the Cartesian tradition and to fashion a
After acknowlnew account of understanding and knowledge."''
edging substantial differences in their backgrounds and trainings,
Mootz posits: "[I]t is plain that Gadamer and Perelman share
important themes: the dialogic character of understanding, the
inadequacy of neo-Kantianism as an account of knowledge, and the
overriding ethical imperative of holding oneself open to questioning

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 318.
Id.
Mootz, supra note 66, at 498.
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and challenges rather than proceeding as if one is possessed of
apodictic truth. ' 112 Mootz also says that Gadamer is developing the
"rhetorical tradition"' to "serve as a resource for textual interpreters
1 13
in our literate culture.'
In synthesizing Gadamer and Perelman, Mootz sees the need to
highlight a couple of weaknesses of Gadamer's approach: Gadamer
"does not develop a pragmatic account of rhetorical exchange"; and,
"Gadamer's phenomenology of understanding remains somewhat
vague with respect to the activities by which people pursue justice and
morality in the course of daily life. ' 114 Perelman provides the perfect
means of correction:
Perelman demonstrated in his first book that arguments about the
dictates of justice could not be rational since they did not accord
with formal logic. Confronted by this bizarre yet inescapable
conclusion, Perelman rejected the Cartesian philosophical tradition
from which it issued and set for himself the task of identifying the
means by which it is possible to secure adherence to reasonable
claims regarding the requirements of justice.'
Mootz traces Perelman's Aristotlean move to "distinguish
rational truths from reasonable arguments. ' 116 In doing this, he says,
"As a prime example, Perelman points to the operation of the legal
system in which arguments are made and action is taken despite the
inevitable lack of indubitable knowledge about the questions raised
by the case at hand.""' 7 Mootz thereby uses Perelman to advance the
case for a style of sociolegal inquiry that can act as a sort of model for
philosophical inquiry more generally, suggesting that this is closer to
an ancient understanding of philosophy than it is to modern thinking
on the matter.118
As I argued earlier, Foucaultian work can also sensibly be
understood as a development of a certain type of ancient thinking
which equally rejects the dominance of Cartesian and neo-Kantian
propositions in favor of a type of pragmatism. As Wahl puts it, "if
one can speak of a continuity from the first to the last in Michel
Foucault's work.., it is found... in his pragmatism ....In other
words, it is not so much a question of what was (or is), but rather of
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 507.
Id.
Mootz, supra note 54, at 320.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 321-23.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:913

what was done, as it was being done."119 Obviously I am not going to
go so far as to say that the Gadamerian and Foucaultian approaches
are equally in the thrall of Perelman, simply that some of the themes

Perelman draws out are examples of what is best about each of the
two packages.
Mootz is obviously involved in a bid to secure a framework that

can be used to consistently capture the practice and the spirit of
knowledge as rhetoric. In this sense, "[r]hetorical knowledge can be
defined as the effort of two or more persons working together
creatively to refashion the linguistically structured symbols of social

cohesion that serve as the resources for intersubjective experience
with the aim of motivating action of some kind."120 Further,
"[r]hetorical activity.., is not a technical skill employed in the
pursuit of independently selected ends but rather is a means of
discerning and evaluating the ends available to a given community
with certain means at its disposal." 21

Mootz, drawing on Perelman, has the legal system at the front of
his thinking: "The legal system is one of the most important fora for
the development of rhetorical knowledge in contemporary American
society."1 22 He supports this claim by making particular use of the
123
1997 Washington v. Glucksberg case about "assisted suicide."
Discussing Justice Souter, Mootz says, "Souter's opinion persuasively
describes the adjudication of fundamental rights as a hermeneuticalrhetorical project in terms that Gadamer and Perelman would

endorse, even though Souter articulates his reasoning in the idiom of
124
contemporary constitutional discourse.

119. Wahl, supra note 23, at 70. DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 1, at xxii (suggesting
that Foucault always worked with a commitment to a certain form of pragmatism). Foucault,
they say, "annoys many by insisting on a pragmatic intent in all significant historiography" and
add that his interpretation of history "grows out of pragmatic concerns." Id.
120. Mootz, supra note 54, at 323.
121. Id. at 325.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 326-27 nn.43 & 47.
124. Id. at 326. Mootz adds:
Souter tracks the philosophical claims made by Gadamer and Perelman about the
nature of human understanding and the acquisition of knowledge, lending support to
the claim that the demands of legal practice may indeed highlight the hermeneuticalrhetorical features of all understanding. Lawyers know very well that argumentation is
a bounded and rational enterprise that nevertheless cannot aspire to a process of
deduction from principles, even though the rhetorical conventions of legal practice and
judicial opinion-writing ironically work to conceal this (supposedly dangerous)
fact ....
Id. at 327.
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A Foucaultian approach to any particular judicial decision might
well accept Mootz's claims about judges and lawyers and their use of
argumentation fitting certain rhetorical philosophical principles.
However, it would also add a historical dimension. No judicial
decision could be understood by a Foucaultian without tying it to a
genealogy of the way decisions are made and presented within
particular jurisdictions: a history of some of the contingenciescourts, written judgements, reporting procedures, architecture, and
other court cultural factors, etc. -of the decisions.
Mootz bids to secure a framework that can be used to
consistently capture the practice and the spirit of legal knowledge as
rhetoric. In this sense,
Rhetorical knowledge can be defined as the effort of two or more
persons working together creatively to refashion the linguistically
structured symbols of social cohesion that serve as the resources for
intersubjective
experience with the aim of motivating action of
125
some kind.

Further, "Rhetorical activity.., is not a technical skill employed in
the pursuit of independently selected ends but rather is a means of
discerning and evaluating the ends available to a given community
with certain means at its disposal. ' 126
In using Perelman in this way, Mootz provides another touch
that might sit well on a Foucaultian canvas. Rather than relying on an
inflexible notion of the individual and individual experience, here the
stress is on the development and management of a particular
intersubjective realm, a community, understood not as an organic
Gemeinschaft but more as a construction, an invention, as
Foucaultians are wont to call it.
So, can I then say that rhetoric, especially as explored by Mootz's
reading of Perelman as a boost to Gadamerians, provides a means of
building an exception to my rule that Gadamerians and Foucaultians
should be very wary of each other? I can only do so weakly. Or more
accurately, I can only do so warily. The above discussion does not, I
suggest, provide a warrant for anything more. And, of course, a
suggestion that Gadamerians and Foucaultians must be wary in
dropping their wariness of the other is hardly an argument against
them being wary.

125. Id. at 323.
126. Id. at 325.
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The final candidate I consider for the status of exception to my
rule is Heelan's Gadamerian account of science that I touched upon
earlier. In building his account, Heelan offers the following point
about "theory" which involves a point about "explanation":
[W]hatever is observed (inside or outside of science) involves
things which are not directly observed but are implied by the
semantic network of the language. Such semantic connections are
not of themselves scientific (i.e., explanatory-theoretical) connections, and do not constitute a theory, for they are to be found in
natural language which is not a theory about the world but a
description of it. A theory is rather about what underlies"explains"-the objects of a descriptive semantic network. 27
Perhaps this passage, while skeptical in a Foucaultian manner, is too
language-focused to appeal to Foucaultians. But, in adding the
following definition of the history of science, Heelan comes closest to
providing a solid link between Gadamerians and Foucaultians:
The history of science is more than the history of scientific writing
and discourse, including illustrations, mathematical models, or
abstract theories; in addition, there is the history of the culture of
laboratory instruments with special reference to readable technologies. 28
This quite Foucaultian account bears a strong similarity to some
of the work of Bruno Latour, one of the founders of a recently
developed school of "science studies" who has been taken up by some
Foucaultians as one of the heirs to Foucault's approach. 12 9 Despite
this, and while conceding that Heelan's Gadamerian account of
science provides the possibility of a genuine link between
Gadamerians and Foucaultians, I head to my conclusion saying that
one strong link does not a bridge make.
CONCLUSION
I have said enough to spell out my argument-it is difficult,
perhaps impossible, to successfully mix Foucaultian and Gadamerian
insights into a framework for sociolegal studies. But perhaps I have
not said enough to make clear my disappointment at this outcome. I
127. Heelan, supra note 56, at 226.
128. Id. at 227. Kockelmans offers a sympathetic critique of Heelan. In doing so, he argues
that "all human truth claims are claims within limited contexts of meaning," and invites greater
consideration by scholars of science of the conditions of truth, a position which might be said to
be closer to some Foucaultians than to most Gadamerians. Joseph J. Kockelmans, Beyond
Realism and Idealism: A Response to Patrick A. Heelan, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS,
supra note 55, at 213, 239.
129. KENDALL & WICKHAM, supra note 15, at 60-61.
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began this project with the genuine hope that some sort of workable
alliance would be forged. I must conclude, albeit reluctantly, by
facing the fact that any attempt to read Foucault and Gadamer
together, through a single lens, inevitably confronts the dilemma of
how to bring them both into focus simultaneously. There is no single
reading, it seems, that is adequate to both, since they are each dealing
with a slightly different, although sometimes overlapping, set of
problems, to which they bring different, though sometimes
overlapping, approaches. At best, one has to adjust one's vision so as
to view each separately. While this means that they cannot be
brought into any simple conjunction, it also means that they cannot
be simply opposed either. As I suggested at the outset, a nodding
acquaintanceship might be as good as it gets. 30

130. I owe the formulation of much of this conclusion to Jeff Malpas.

